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1. Introduction

P

rofessor Garraway and the organizers of this panel asked me to address a
piece by Professor Adam Roberts entitled "Detainees, Torture, and Incompetence in the 'War on Terror.'''J As the title indicates, the piece is highly critical of
US actions over the past six years, and uses a review of three different books as a
launch pad for its arguments. In brief, Professor Roberts takes a largely retrospective look at US detention and interrogation policies since September 11 ,200 1, arguing that a number of US decisions along the way led to the abuses at Abu Ghraib.
He recognizes that it is complicated to apply the law of war to certain individuals
fighting US forces in different conflicts. but he concludes that the President's decision to treat them "humanely" in 2002 did not provide a dear legal framework and
charges the Bush Administration with both bad intentions and incompetence.
Professor Roberts discusses the legal and policy confusion that currently exists in
Afghanistan among the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the
government of Afghanistan related to detainee treatment, and proposes that
NATO establish rules for treatment of detainees who are not entitled to prisoner of
war status. Finally, he reflects the often-heard concern about a perceived threat to
US separation of powers principles and condudes that the resort by the United
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States to a "war on terror" paradigm leaves quite a bit to be desired, even in the
wake of all of the changes the US government has put in place since September I I.
By way of response, I will spend my time discussing three issues: where US law
and policy currently stand in the three conflicts the United States is fighting, the
processes by which we arrived at our current positions, and how we might address
some of the ongoing legal and operational confusion in Afghanistan among NATO
allies. In foc using on the current state of US law and policy, I do not mean to suggest that several still-unresolved debates about the applicability of the Geneva Conventions-and of the war paradigm to our struggle with al Qaeda more generallyare irrelevant. But to move this multiyear dialogue fOlWard, I think it is important
to use the current state of playas the jumping-off point, whatever one may think of
the decisions that the United States made in the immediate aftermath of September
11,200 1.
Before I dive in, I would like to say something about the abuses of detainees described in the books that Adam Roberts has reviewed. Like many in the US government, including the military itself, I will not and cannot defend that abuse. Events
like Abu Ghraib have been devastating to the reputation of the United States, especially in European and Arab States. Professor Roberts raises a number of arguments about the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and with al Qaeda with which I
do not agree, and which I look forward to addressing. But I wanted to make clear
up fro nt that detainee abuse warrants no defense.
II. Where We A re Now-A Snapshot

The State Department's Legal Adviser, John Bellinger, spent a week in January
seMng as a guest blogger on O pinio Juris, a website devoted to international law
and politics. He posted pieces on Common Article 3, unlawful belligerency and the
US conflict with al Qaeda, among other topics.2 Professor Garraway served as a
guest respondent and opened his post with an old Irish saying. The saying involves
a foreigner who asks an Irishman for directions from his current location to the
nearest town. The Irishman tells him, "Well, I wouldn't start from here!"3 But
"here" is precisely where I would like to start. As I noted, Professor Roberts concludes his review with an assertion that the United States continues to rely on
flawed structures and rules to deal with its conflict with al Qaeda, and bemoans
where the United States has ended up in 2007. To evaluate this conclusion, let's
take a snapshot of where we are right now, putting aside the various legal developments that have gotten us to this point.
Because different legal paradigms apply to US conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
and with al Qaeda, I will treat each of them separately.
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A. Afghanistan
ISAF is operating in Afghanistan under (most recently) UN Security Council Resolution 1707, a Chapter VII resolution that authorizes member States participating
in ISAF to "take all necessary measures to fulfi] its mandate."4 The United States
takes part in ISAF and also continues to lead a coalition called Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF), the force that intelVened in Afghanistan in November 2001 after
the United States decided to respond in self-defense following the September 11 attacks. The United States has not formally revisited its view that the conflict in Afghanistan is an international armed conflict. The argument that it remains an
international armed conflict is based on the fact that the US government and the
coalition forces that are part ofISAF and OEF continue to fight the same entities
that OEF began to fight in 200 I, at which time it clearly was an international armed
conflict between the United States and the Taliban.
In this ongoing conflict, the United States applies the rules on targeting appropriate to international anned conflict-most notably, distinction and proportionality, as well as limitations on the use of certain weapons. Professor Roberts
acknowledged US targeting rules in a talk he gave at the Brookings Institution in
2002, where he stated, "In the conduct of the air war [in Afghanistan ], as in Iraq in
'91 and as also in Serbia in '99, the United States clearly accepted the relevance and
indeed value of the rules restricting targeting to militarily significant targets and I
think that needs to be frankly and honestly recognized. "5 US Department of Defense (000) policy, as reflected in the 000 directive on the Law of War Program,
is that
members of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed
conflicts. however such conflicts are characterized. and in all other militaryoperations.
and that the law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by
the DoD Components and DoD contractors assigned to or accompanying deployed
Armed Forces.6
The Directive defines "the law of war" as encompassing " all international law for
the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party,
and applicable customary international law ." This reflects a decision by the US military that, as a general matter, applying the rules of international armed conflict to
all conflicts however characterized (I ) is the right thing to do as a moral and humanitarian matter and (2) gives the military a single standard to which to train.
The US processing and treatment of detainees in Afghanistan is governed by
several laws and policies. To ensure that we are detaining only those people who
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pose a security threat, we have established status review processes (just as we have
in Iraq and at Guantanamo). The first review takes place at the time of capture to
determine if the person being detained is an enemy combatant. The second review
occurs usually within seventy-five days and in no event more than a hundred days
of the individual's coming into DoD custody. The review is based on all reasonably
available and relevant information . A detainee's status determination may be subject to further review if additional information comes to light. The combatant
commander may interview witnesses and/or convene a panel of commissioned officers to make a recommendation to him . That commander must review the detainee's status on an annual basis, although he has tended to do so every six
months. The Review Board also nominates certain Afghan detainees for entry into
Afghanistan's reconciliation program. The government of Afghanistan then vets
the nominees and selects some to return to their village elders to be reintegrated.'
We also have established dear treatment rules. First, the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA) makes clear that no detainee in US custody or control, regardless of where he is held or by which US entity, may be subjected to cruel, inhwnan
or degrading treatment,S as those terms are understood in the US reselVations to
the Convention Against Torture (CAT).9 Second, the DoD detainee directive issued in September 2006 provides that "all detainees shall be treated humanely and
in accordance with U.S. law, the law of war, and applicable U.S. policy."IOThe latter
further states that all persons subject to the Directive shall apply at a minimum the
standards articulated in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions without regard toa detainee's legal status. The Directive also requires that detainees not
be subjected to public curiosity, reprisals, medical or scientific experiments, or sensorydeprivation. And it states that all persons in DoD control will be provided with
prisoner of war protections until a competent authority determines some other legal status. Some have expressed concern that the rules in the Detainee Directive are
policy protections, not legal protections. But soldiers who mistreat detainees can
be prosecuted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
Finally, interrogations of individuals in DoD custody, wherever held, are governed by the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations,
which is publicly available, and which expressly prohibits a number of interrogation techniq ues, including using military working dogs, inducing hypothennia or
heat injury, applying physical pain, and placing hoods or sacks over the eyes of
detainees. II
Does all this mean that the conflict in Afghanistan no longer poses hard legal,
policy or tactical questions? It does not. These are the US rules, but thirty-seven nations contribute to ISAF, and each contingent operates within a different legal
framework.. The contributing member States have different views about what type
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of conflict exists in Afghanistan; some question whether an ar med conflict exists at
all. I will address lingering complications about the situation in Afghanistan later
in this article.
B. Iraq
The activities of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF- I) currently are governed by
a UN Security Council resolution issued pursuant to Chapter VII. Under Resolution 1546, which the Security Council adopted unanimously on June 8, 2004, the
mandate ofMNF- 1 is "to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters [from Secretary
of State Powell and then-Iraqi Prime Minister AyadAllawi] annexed to this resolution."12 The annexed letters describe a broad range of tasks that MNF-I may undertake to counter "ongoing security threats," including "internment where this is
necessary for imperative reasons of security."13 The letter from Secretary Powell
states that the "forces that make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all
times to act consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions. "14
Security Council Resolution 1546 required review of the MNF-I mandate
within twelve months. Subsequent resolutions have extended this authority temporally-most recently Resolution 1723, which extends the Resolution 1546 mandate until December 2007 . Resolution 1723 affirms the importance for all forces
promoting security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with the law of armed
conflict, and the annexed letter from Secretary Rice states that the forces that make
up MNF- I remain committed to acting consistently with their obligations and
rights under international law, including the law of armed conflict. ls
The detention standard contained in Resolution 1546 ("imperative reasons of
security") is drawn directly from Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,I6
and was included in the annexed letters to indicate that the same basis for
detentions that coalition forces applied before J une 28, 2004 would contin ue to apply after governing authority was transferred to the sovereign government of Iraq.
Domestic Iraqi law (in the form of CPA Memorandum No. 3 17 ) provides detailed
requirements fo r the conditions and proced ures for security internment, including
review of detention within seven days, as well as further periodic reviews. These periodic reviews occur in the form of the Combined Review and Release Board
(CRRB), a majority-Iraqi board that assesses the threat posed by each detainee. IS
Memorandum No. 3 states that the operation, condition and standards of an y internment facility established by MNF- I shall be in accordance with the Fourth
Geneva Convention, Part III, Section IV.19 (This includes requirements to provide
internees with food, water, clothing and medical attention, and give them the
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ability to hold religious services, engage in physical exercise, and send and receive
letters.) Memorandum No.3 requires MNF-I to release individuals from security
internment or transfer them to the Iraqi criminal justice system no later than eighteen months from the date of detention, unless further detention is approved by
the loint Detention Committee, which is staffed by senior officials.20 The CPA
Memorandum also provides for guaranteed International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRe) access to internees.21
To break my own rule and dive backward into history, I want to correct
misimpressions about whether the United States as a government ever asserted
that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to its conflict with the government of
Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent occupation of Iraq. Professor Roberts refers in his
review of Mark Danner's book Tortureatld TrUll! to an excerpt of an e-mail written
in mid-August 2003 from a captain in military intelligence in Iraq.22 That e-m ail
suggests that the captain believed that he could apply different rules of engagement and interrogation techniques to " unlawful enem y combatants" detained in
Iraq. Danner also cites an effort by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, thenCommander MNF-I, to change the legal status of some of those detained to "unlawful enemy combatants";23 however, General Sanchez did not have the authority to
make that determination. Indeed, this was not and did not become US policy. In
mid-2004, then-Secrctary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, "Iraq's a nation.
The United States is a nation. The Geneva Conventions applied. They have applied
every single day from the outset. "24
Similarly, in his commentary The Torture Memos,25 Josh Dratel fails to distinguish between the different rules that apply to Afghanistan, Guantanamo and Iraq;
he is not correct when he asserts that the United States desired to abrogate the
Geneva Conventions with respect to the treatment of persons seized in the context
of armed hostilities in Iraq. The Geneva Conventions applied directly to that conflict up to the end of occupation on June 28, 2004, and continued to apply-as the
Conventions require-to any individual who remained detained as a prisoner of
war or protected person. The Security Council resolutions, the annexed letters referring to MNF-I compliance with the laws of war and CPA Memorandwn No.3
now provide the governing rules for MNF-I, and US laws such as the Detainee
Treatment Act 26 and the War Crim es Act 27 provide additional rules for the US contingent ofMNF-1.

C. Conflict with al Qaeda
The United States is aware that many States and scholars continue to be skeptical
that a State can be in an armed conflict with a non-State actor primarily outside
that State's territory. However, the United States, for reasons the State Department
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Legal Adviser has set forth publicly in some detail, continues to believe that such a
conflict can and does exist. The US Supreme Court has supported that view, most recentlyin Hamdatl v. RumsJefd. 18 ln the wake of that opinion, the protections ofCommon Artiele 3 apply to all members of al Qaeda detained in that conflict. Those al
Qaeda members we detain in Afghanistan and Iraq are subject to the detention and
review provisions I have already described. The treatment of al Qaeda members detained at Guantanamo is governed by the DTA and the Army intelligence collection manual.19 (All of the detainees there are in DoD custody.) Further, because the
Supreme Court has held that our conflict with al Qaeda is a non-international
armed conflict, the Military Commissions Act (MCA)30 provisions that criminalize
violations of most provisions of Common Article 3, including torture, cruel treatment, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, rape and mutilation, would apply to those who mistreat al Qaeda detainees. The ICRC has access to everyone held
at Guantanamo.
The detention review process for individuals held at Guantanamo, many of
whom are associated with al Qaeda, is somewhat different from review processes in
Iraq and Afghanistan. I assume that the readers are familiar with the Combatant
Status Review T ribunals (CSRTs), by which the United States determines whether
these individuals are in fact enemy combatants. As recently updated in the MCA,
detainees may appeal their CSRT determination to a federal civilian court, the DC
Circuit Court of Appeals. That Court, in the Bismullah v. Gates and Parhat v. Gates
cases, currently is considering the evidentiary standards by which it will review
CSRT decisions.)! There is another process by which the United States reviews ongoing detention in Guantanamo: when the CSRT upholds a detainee's status as an
enemy combatant and the United States does not intend to prosecute the detainee
in a military commission, the detainee receives an annual review by an Administrative Review Board (ARB), which assesses whether he continues to pose a serioussecurity threat to the United States. Hundreds of individuals have been released from
Guantanamo since it opened, under the CSRT and ARB processes.
These processes are more detailed and more regularized than the Article 5 tribunals that the Third Geneva Convention delineates for cases of doubt regarding
prisoner-of-war stat us. This is so btxause we are trying to balance--on the one
hand-the fact that the law of war recognizes that a State can detain enemy combatants figh ting against it until the end of the conflict with-on the other handan acknowledgment that the end of this conflict may be a long way off. The United
States is aware of concerns about indefinite detention that flow from the fact that
this conflict is of indefinite length and has taken these steps so that we are not holding anyone longer than necessary.
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D. Hard Q uestions
This is where the law, rules and procedures have ended up in mid-2007. I will leave
it for others to discuss whether or how Abu Ghraib might have been avoided. But
in any case it should be dear that these issues are hard, and getting it right has taken
some trial and error. We are not the first government to have grappled with difficult questions at the beginning of a period of violence and terrorist attacks, and we
will not be the last. Professor Roberts has described elsewhere the fact that the
United Kingdom initially ignored international standards of treatment in Northern Ireland, which "led them into terrible trouble."n In fact, the United Kingdom
in the initial, militarized phase of the "Troubles" occasionally used "war talk," although, unlike the United States, the government generally did not characterize
the fighti ng as an armed conflict in the legal sense. 33 The UK government resorted
to detention without charge and interrogation techniques that the European Court
of Human Rights later deemed to violate the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) . Professor Roberts makes a fair point about the lessons of history in
his book review: any State fighting a non-State actor, including the United States,
would be well selVed to pay attention to the examples of the United Kingdom in
Ireland and the French in Algeria. 1 was not working on these issues at the time, but
I expect that there was a strong belief that an attack by nineteen terrorists that killed
over three thousand people in one day lacked historical precedent in key ways.
Even Professor Roberts recognizes that it was not obvious how to apply existing
laws and rules to this type of non-State actor.
If application of law of war rules to the confli ct with al Qaeda were easy, we
would not see so many people-in fo reign governments, non-governmental organizations and the academy-hold so many different views on how to treat this confli ct. Some say it is not an armed conflict, so the United States should have used law
enforcement measures to quash al Qaeda after the 9/1 1 attacks. Others say that
there is an armed conflict in Afghanistan, but that a State cannot be in an armed
conflict with a non-State actor outside its territory without also being in an armed
conflict with the State in which the non-State actor is operating. Yet others acknowledge that a State can be in an extraterritorial armed conflict with a non-State
actor when hostilities between those groups meet the threshold level of violence
that constitutes an armed conflict. The US government has explained elsewhere
why exclusive reliance on a law enforcement paradigm was not possible, and described how the UN Security Council and NATO have recognized that non-State
actors can engage in armed attacks against States at a level to trigger that State's
right of self-defense. But we recognize that others do not agree.
Even the more traditional conflicts are complicated. The Geneva Conventions
provide rules for a three-stage process: armed conflict between States, occupation
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by one State of the other State and peace. But what happens when, as in Iraq, armed
conflict continues after occupation ends? What is the status of the many different
conflicts in Iraq? Or in Afghanistan, where a new governm ent took power less than
a year after the figh ting began, b ut the conflict between the United States and the
Taliban continues? If the Afghan conflict has switched from international to noninternational, what does that mean for those detained in the international phase of
the conflict? Does it matter for allies in a coalition with a host government how that
host characterizes the violence? Can Chapter VII resolutions render some of these
questions m oot? These are not easy questions, and we continue to work with our
allies to find good answers.

III. How We Got Here-The US System
With regard to the United States and the three armed conflicts I have discussed,
many look at the glass as still half-empty. This seems to be due at least in part to the
suspicion about the United States that the last five years has engendered among legal scholars, European allies and human rights advocates. These views are colored
by abuses in Guantanam o and Abu Ghraib , by objections to the CIA interrogation
program and undisclosed detention facilities overseas, and concern about the use
of renditions. But one may also look at the current state of law and practice as a
glass half-full, where the United States has built on the decisions made in 2001-02
to m ove to a clear, rob ust framework for treatm ent, where everyone knows the
rules. In addition to assessing the substance of the current rilles, I also want to talk a
bit about the process by which we arrived " here," because that process is another
reason to be o ptimistic about the United States.
We arrived "here" in 2007 as the result of vigorous debate and activity within
each of our three branches of governm ent . The executive branch established a
n umber of detainee policies related to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban
in Afghanistan and set u p m ilitary commissions to try those suspected of war
crimes and related offenses. In 2001, Congress passed the Authorization to Use
Military Force,14 and later enacted the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military
Commissions Act. The federal courts have opined on several of these executive decisions about detainee policies and m ilitary commissions, and on the MCA. This,
in my view, speaks to the strength of the US constitutional system. Professor Roberts expresses a sense that our bedrock separation of powers principles are threatened and suggests that the executive branch has dominated the decision m aking.
Consider, however, recent comments by Professor Neil Katyal, who argued the
Hamdan case in the Suprem e Court on behalf of the detainee. He states, "1 believe
that the Hamdan decision-which invalidated the President's system of military
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commissions-represents a histor ic victory for our constitutional process, and, in
particular, the role of the United States Congress and federal judiciary in our tripartite system of government. "3S He also stated:
[A]s a student of history, I know it's hard for the Supreme Court in a time of armed
conflict to rebuke the President . ... And here the Administration has managed to [lose
a case du ring armed conflict ] several times . ... [The Department oOustice] said . . .
[detainees] won't have habeas corpus rights. Well, the Supreme Court said no in the
Rasul case. The Administration said that U.S. citizens can be held indefinitely
incommunicado. The Supreme Court said no in Hamdi. The Administration said, you
can have military commission [sic] and try these people. The Supreme Court said no in
Hamootl. 36

The justices themselves seem confident that our separatio n of powers is healthy.
In Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Hamdan, he writes that the Court's conclusion "ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a 'blank check."'37 He furthe r describes the majority opinion as keeping "faith
in those democratic means" necessarily implicit in the Constitution's tripartite
structure. These statements recall Justice Souter's concurrence in Hamdi, in which
he stated, "For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of government
asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation's reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the
way to victory. . "38
Many, including Professor Roberts, might have wished for us to get to this place
in the first instance-to get it right immediately after Septem ber 200 1, with cool
heads and a clear understanding ofthe lessons of history. It would have saved years
in litigation, permitted the United States to try detainees accused of war crimes
m uch faster and avoided significant tension with European allies-but we did not
develop on September 12 all of the processes and laws we have in place now. It is
important to recognize, however, that the Suprem e Court has confirmed several of
the Ad ministration's basic legal positions with respect to its detentio n policies. It
has confirmed that the United States is in a state of armed conflict with al Qaeda. It
has confirmed that the law of war, and in particular Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, applies to that conflict.
More fine-tuning is likely to follow because there are several important cases
pending or on appeal in o ur courts. I already mentioned the Parhat case, where
the DC Circuit will decide whether it can look to documents beyond those contained in a detainee's CSRT record to determine whether to uphold the CSRT determination. A panel of the Fourth Circuit recently decided the AI Marri case. 39 In
2003, the United States detained a1 Marri as an enemy combatant; at the time of aI
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Marri's detention he resided in the United States. (He has been held in a brig in
South Carolina since that time.) The United States agreed that the detainee had
constitutional rights, including a right to habeas corpus, but argued that the Military Commissions Act applied to him, and that Congress in the MCA had created
an adequate and effective substitute by which al Marri could contest his detention.
The Fourth Circuit panel held that the Military Commissions Act did not apply to
al Marri; that the Court therefore had jurisdiction over his habeas corpus claim;
that al Marri had constitutional due process rights; and that, despite the President's detennination in 2003 that al Marri was an enemy combatant closely associated with al Qaeda, the United States could not detain al Macri as an enemy
combatant because it had not properly detennined that he (1) was a citizen or
member of an armed force at war with the United States, (2) was seized on or near
a battlefield on which an armed conflict with the United States was taking place,
(3) was in Afghanistan during the armed conflict there, or (4) directly participated
in hostilities against the United States or its allies.40 The Court granted al Marri habeas relief, while noting that the US government was free to prosecute him for
criminal offenses."] The United States has appealed this decision, seeking rehearing tn bane.
Another court will consider whether Majid Khan, one of the fourteen detainees
brought to Guantanamo Bay in September 2006 and someone to whom the US
government previously had granted asylwn, has a constitutional right to habeas
corpus. And as military commissions get under way, we should expect to see appeals of final commission decisions to the DC Circuit, which will need to interpret
the standards of review contained in the DT A, as amended by the MCA. And it is
clear, even now, that the military judges are acting independently. In the Khadr and
Hamdan cases, the two military judges dismissed the prosecution cases without
prejudice. The basis for their decisions was that the CSRTs had not determined that
the accused were "unlawful" enemy combatants (a prerequisite status for trial by
military commission), but rather that they simply were enemy combatants. It
seems safe to say that we have not seen the last of any of the three branches as we attempt to "strik[el the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the
way to victory."

N . Lingering Confusion-Afghanistan
Just because the US government has a clear set of rules for detention in Afghanistan
does not mean that we are working seamlesslywith allies that have different rules.
Professor Roberts flags the "precious little unifonnity" and "ongoing policy confusion" in Afghanistan. This is particularly true on detainee issues: some States are
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reluctant to detain combatants at all, other States hand detainees over quickly to
the government of Afghanistan and yet other States choose not to transfer all of
their detainees to the Afghans. Why is this the case, and can we move toward
greater harmony?
A. Differen t Views of the Conflict
One reason that contributing States approach detainee treatment differently in Afghanistan is that they take different views of the legal nature of the situation there.
There are four possible positions: that it is an international armed conflict; that it is
a non-international armed conflict; that it is not an anned conflict at all. and thus
that ISAF is engaged in security or peacekeeping operations; and that. depending
on the level of hostilities, it is at times an armed conflict and at times a security
operation.
As 1 mentioned earlier. the argument that it is an international armed conflict
fl ows from the idea that the conflict is very similar to the conflict that began in
November 200 1 in Operation Enduring Freedom and that the initial conflict has
continued without interruption between the same parties. Under this theory. the
right to self-defense continues. the consent of the government of Afghanistan to
troop presence is important but not necessary. and individuals detained in the international armed conflict may continue to be detained.~ 2 It is not clear whether
the Hamdatl decision. which deemed at least the al Qaeda part of the conflict
non-international, affects the US view of the status of the conflict in Afghanistan.
The argument that it is a non-international armed conflict flows fro m a belief
that, as of June 2002, when the Karzai government took power. the conflict in Afghanistan evolved away from a conflict between two States (the classical conflict
identified in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions) and became a conflict
between the new Afghan government and countries supporting it on the one hand.
and Taliban andal Qaeda forces on the other. Thus. the conflict resembles an internationalized non-international armed conflict of the type that Hans-Peter Gasser
described in 1983.43 The lCRC takes this view. and asserts that Common Article 3.
customary international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts and
Afghan human rights laws apply to the conflict.oW Canada presumably also takes
this view: although it is treating its detainees in Afghanistan consistent with the
Third Geneva Convention, it appears to be doing so as a matter of policy. not law.
However, the fact that it is relying on a core law of war treaty for detention guidance suggests that it views the situation as an armed conflict.45
Third. the German government may not believe that it is an armed conflict at
all. German documents describing its role in Afghanistan refer only to stability
operations-the documents make no reference to armed conflict.46 This seems
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surprising, given the level of violence, numbers of troops killed and widespread
use of military responses around the country to suppress the Taliban. Finally, at
least one State seems to take the view that the situation fluctuates between being
an armed conflict and falling below the threshold of conllict that triggers application of the law of war.
What is the view of the Afghan government on this question? It is not clear that
the government has formally stated its view that this is or is not an armed conllict,
but its use of its military to fight the Taliban and detain individuals without charge,
as well as its consent to the presence of thousands of foreign troops who continue to
engage in combat operations, suggests that the Afghan government would conclude
that it is in an armed conflict. It has not, however, invoked a state of emergency under its constitution. If it is a non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3,
customary intemationallaw applicable in Common Article 3 conflicts and Afghanistan's domestic human rights obligations would govern Afghanistan's treatment of
detainees held in the conflict. (This explains why the ISAF/Interim Administration
document that Professor Roberts cites refers to the Interim Administration's obligation to conform with "internationally recognized human rights.")
It should also be recognized that Security Council Resolution 1707 provides a
legal basis under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for ISAF operations, including detention, regardless of the nature of the fighting in Afghanistan. In some respects,
this makes the need to resolve the precise nature of the conflict less important, as
ISAP's authorities under the resolution do not depend on the nature of the conflict
(or even on the continued existence of a conflict) . It also suggests that potentially
differing views of the conflict by ISAF members need not prevent effective detention operations on the ground. One could imagine some kind of future arrangement whereby ISAF States were to agree that they would, at a minimum, apply
Common Article 3 to detainees; and that States could at their discretion apply
higher standards of treatment as a matter of policy; and if the Afghan government
agreed that it would apply Common Article 3 and applicable human rights provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights47and the government of Afghanistan's constitution and laws, then it may not be necessary formally
to reconcile the competing descriptions of what is happening on the ground in
Afghanistan.
B. Different Legal Obligations and Domestic Politics
Another reason that ISAP States have taken diverse approaches to detention is that
they have different legal obligations and face different political pressures. Most notably, European member State contributors to ISAF may be concerned that, in
some circumstances, the European Convention on Human Rights 4ll extends to
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their activities outside their own territories, even during armed conflict. In A/Skein; and others v. SecretaryoJState Jar Defence, for instance, the United Kingdom
conceded that the ECHR applied to its detention of one individual who died in its
custody in Iraq.49 The UK Court of Appeal upheld a High Court finding that the
United Kingdom's Human Rights ActSO and the ECHR applied to that individual's
case because he was within the authority and control of UK forces in Iraq.51 The
House of Lords has just upheld that decision, with the apparent result that any person held by UK forces abroad (and therefore in the United Kingdom's "effective
control") would be covered by the Human Rights Act and the ECHR.52 Similarly,
the European Court of Human Rights, in the Saramati case, just considered
whether troops from France, Gennany and NOlWay, acting as officers of the NATO
Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo (KFOR) and UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), violated Articles 1, 5, 6 and 13 of the ECHR in detaining a particular individual. S) And
in the Behram; case, the European Court of Human Rights just considered whether
France violated an individual's right to life when the individual died from unexploded ordnance in the area of Kosovo in which France was participating in the
KFOR mission. 54 The European Court of Human Rightsconduded that these cases
were inadmissible because each respondent State's acts were "attributable" to the
United Nations, pursuant to Chapter VII authority that authorized KFOR and
UNMIK, and that the European Court of Human Rights was not in a position to
scrutinize these acts. The Court, therefore, was not forced to address how it would
have decided the questions if the States had been acting in their sovereign capacities.
Even though France, Germany and NOlWay won their cases, one imagines that
the possibility of such cases, and the lingering ambiguity about whether the Court
would have reached a different conclusion if the States were not acting under UN
auspices, must create different, and potentially very cautious, political and legal approaches to conflict and peacekeeping for ECHR States parties.
In addition to the ECHR, most NATO member States are parties to Additional
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions,55 whereas the United States is not.
In the Afghan conflict, it is not clear whether this fact would have (or has had)
any significant impact on the ground. Further, most NATO member States believe that their legal obligations flowing fro m treaties such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights$/) and the Convention Against TortureS?
apply to their activities extraterritorially. This may account for the fac t that the
bilateral agreements between NATO States and the Afghan Ministry of Defense
regarding individuals detained by ISAF contain provisions that appear to reflect
the non-refoulement obligations contained in Article 3 of the CAT. The United
States historically has not taken the position that its CAT obligations apply
extraterritorially, although as a matter of policy the United States will not transfer
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an individual outside of its territory to a coun try where it is m ore likely than not
that he will be tortured.
Human Rights Watch has described these bilateral arrangements with the government of Afghanistan as follows:
[TJhey share many common features, such as an agreement that NATO forces will
release detainees or transfer them to Afghan custody within 96 hours, and that NATO
and Afghan authorities will treat detainees in accordance with international law. The
agreements further stipulate that Afghan authorities will not try, release, or transfer
detainees to a third country without the explicit agreement of NATO forces
(presumably to avoid transfer of detainees to ... jurisdictions where detainees may be
subject to mistreatment). Under the agreements seen by Human Rights Watch, NATO
forces, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, will have access to
detainees even after they have been transferred to Afghan custody.58
When Canada operated as part of OEF, the Canadian forces turned detainees
over to US forces in Afghanistan, but came under public pressure not to do SO.59
Under the original 2005 Canada-Afghanistan Detainee Transfer Arrangement, the
Afghanistan Independent H wnan Rights Commission had guaran teed that it
would report any abuses to the Canadian government. As a result of public concern about the m istreatm en t in Afghan custody of d etainees turned over by Canadian forces, the Canadian government recently amended the 2005 Arrangement
to bring it into line with pre-existing Denmark-Afghanistan, United KingdomAfghanistan and Netherlands-Afghanistan arrangements/,o The new Arrangemen t
allows Canadians to en ter Afghan detention facilities at "any tim e. "61
The United States in its OEF capacity has been cautious about turning over detainees to the government of Afghanistan, due in part to our desire to confirm with
greater clarity the legal basis on which the government of Afghanistan would hold
them. Con trast the Canadian position: General Gauthier, the lieutenant general
who commands the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command and thus oversees
all Canadian forces deployed abroad, was quoted as saying, "Our d efault setting is
transfer. We haven't held anybody for more than a few hours and we would prefer
not to. "62 As a result of certain allies' concerns about turning detainees over to the
United States or to the Afghans, som e allies are choosing not to detain at all, which
renders the mission less effective. 63
Consider the following by David Bosco:
About 7,000 troops from Canada, Britain and the Netherlands are fending off a Taliban
resurgence. The demanding mission . .. has also confronted alliance members with the
uncomfortable reality that fighting often means taking prisoners. America, of COUf!>e,
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has been taking prisoners in Afghanistan for some time. And that's part of the problem.
The European and Canadian publics have been disgusted by reports of prisoner abuse,
and they want nothing to do with what they see as American excess ... . So NATO
countries have essentially opted out of the detainee business. Before committing their
troops to combat areas, the Canadian, Dutch and British governments signed
agreements with the Afghan government stating that any captured fighters would be
handed over to Afghan authorities rathe r than to American forces. In practice, these
agreements mean that NATO troops have no system in place for regularly
interrogatingTaliban fighters for intelligence purposes. Whenever possible, they let the
Afghan troops they operate with take custody. When that's not possible, they house
their prisoners briefly in makeshift facilities while they arrange a transfer to the
Afghans. NATO guidelines call for the handover of priwners within 96 hours, far too
brief a time for wldiers to even know whom they're holding. And once prisoners are in
Afghan hands, international forces easily lose track of them. It's not good policy. Not
only is NATO forfeiting the intelligence benefits that can come with real-time
interrogation, it's sending detainees into an Afghan prison system poorly equipped to
handle them and rife with abuse. 64
A H uman Rights Watch report confirms the reluctance to detain that Bosco describes. Th at report, fro m November 2006, states,
Dutch forces operating in Oruzgan announced their first five detainees two weeks ago,
while British and Canadian forces operating in Helmand and Kandahar, respectively,
have publicly acknowledged fewer than 100 detainees. Given the ferocity of the fighting
in these areas, the absence of more detainees raises two alarming alternatives: either
that NATO forces are not taking detainees, or, more likely, that NATO forces are
circumventing their bilateral agreements by immediately turning over detainees to
Afghan authorities and thus abrogating their responsibility to monitor the detainees'
treatment.6S
Even the political approaches to the figh ting in Afghan istan are different. The
New York Times described the Dutch and US ap proaches as follows:
[HJere in Uruzgan Province, where the Taliban operate openly, a Dutch-led task force
has mostly shunned combat. Its counterinsurgency tactics emphasize efforts to
improve Afghan living conditions and self-governance, rather than hunting the
Taliban's fighters. Bloodshed is out. Reconstruction, mentoring and diplomacy are in.
American military officials have expressed unease about the Dutch method. warning
that if the Taliban are not kept under military pressure in Uruzgan, they will use the
province as a haven and project their insurgency into neighboring provinces.66
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C. Toward Greater Hannonization
Presumably greater harmony in our approach to the situation in Afghanistan
would be useful, as it would permit us more easily to transfer detainees among the
various contingents, increase the intelligence we can gather from detainees, approach the Afghan government with a united front, and increase interoperability.
Can we achieve greater harmonization? Professor Roberts suggests that the government of Afghanistan establish a country-wide detention regime, although it is
not clear ifhe is suggesting that the regime would or should apply to individuals
picked up and held by ISAF fo rces as well. He also suggests that NATO develop a
binding set of rules on all aspects of treatment of security detainees not entitled to
prisoner-of-war protections. This seems sensible, although NATO already tried
once to achieve such a framework for Afghanistan and was able only to come to
agreement on broad parameters.67 Other ideas might include a new UN Security
Council resolution containing language parallel to Resolution 1546, and a more
detailed framework modeled on CPA Memorandum No.3 (such that standards of
any internment facility shall be in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention,
Part lll, Section IV). Finally, ISAF States could agree as a policy matter to treat all
detainees in their custody as prisoners of war. One might also explore practical
changes as well, such asa "left-seat, right-seat" approach to Afghan detention facilities, whereby the government of Afghanistan runs the detention facility with assistance and oversight by NATO forces from different countries. Any such solutions
would require certain legal and political concessions from both the US government
and other NATO contributors.

V. Conclusion
I would like to circle back to Professor Roberts's ongoing discomfort with the US
efforts dealing with the "war on terror" since September 11. Professor Roberts, like
many other critics of US policy over the last six years, is concerned about the
phrase "war on terror." But the phrase "global war on terror" is a political statement, not a legal assertion. 68 The United States uses this term to mean that all nations must strongly oppose terrorism in all of its forms, around the world. We do
not think we are in an armed conflict with all terrorists everywhere. We do, however, believe that we are in a legal state of armed conflict with al Qaeda, which includes an armed conflict in Afghanistan. That said, the questions raised by this
anned conflict are difficult, and the laws in place on September II-internationally
and domestically-were not crafted to deal with the factual scenario we suddenly
faced. In working through these difficult problems, the balance of powers in the
US system has worked-not failed-for many of the critical elements of the three
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conflicts discussed. I would challenge this audience and our friends and critics to
look objectively at where the law now stands, and determine on that basis whether
a detention framework now exists that strikes an appropriate and durable balance
between humanitarian concerns and military requirements in this and future
non-traditional conflicts. 1 would also suggest that detention in Afghanistan presents hard questions not just for the United States but for all States contributing to
lSAP, and that we should continue to put our heads together on these difficult and
pressing questions.
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